

grams that send out billions of dollars to the biggest farm entities? All this does is damage our ability to help people we originally intended to help, the small, average, medium-size farms, and even now the larger family-size operations.

Look back at the intent of our first farm bills. We have never intended to subsidize every single acre of every single bushel. We need to move back closer to having the marketplace be part of that decision on how much of what crop a producer produces. So to say to these giant farm operations that we are going to subsidize you at a level that is going to protect however many bushels or pounds that you produce of whatever commodity, then we encourage that additional production.

I say one of the effects of this kind of limitation is to have that big farmer think twice and look at the marketplace, look at the demand, and put some effort into expanding our international markets, expanding our ability to sell our products in foreign lands.

So I would ask, Madam Speaker, that we support this effort to have some kind of a limit on payments. I am so convinced, spending my life in agriculture and as a farmer, that if we continue to have this bad publicity of these huge million-dollar payments, I think we are going to, if you will, jeopardize the future of farm programs.

This bill also says let us make a greater effort in conservation and in agricultural research that can help all farmers.

Madam Speaker, I include the following for the RECORD.

The following table, prepared at your request, shows the number acres it would take to reach \$150,000 if LDPs were made based upon actual past marketing loan prices and season average farm prices.

ACRES NEEDED TO RECEIVE \$150,000 IN LDP BENEFITS
BASED ON SEASON AVERAGE PRICES

Commodity crop year	Average yield (units/acre)	Marketing loan price (\$/unit)	Season average price (\$/unit)	Hypothetical LDP pmt. (\$/unit)	Acres for \$150,000 in LDPs (acres)
Wheat (bu):					
2001/02 Forecast	40.2	\$2.58	\$2.80	-\$0.22	na
2000/01 Estimate	42.0	2.58	2.62	-.04	na
1999/00	42.7	2.58	2.48	0.10	35,129
1998/99	43.2	2.58	2.65	-.07	na
Corn (bu):					
2001/02 Forecast	138.2	1.89	1.90	-.01	na
2000/01 Estimate	136.9	1.89	1.85	0.04	27,392
1999/00	133.8	1.89	1.82	0.07	16,015
1998/99	134.4	1.89	1.94	-.05	na
Sorghum (bu):					
2001/02 Forecast	59.9	1.71	1.85	-.14	na
2000/01 Estimate	60.9	1.71	1.89	-.18	na
1999/00	69.7	1.74	1.57	0.17	12,659
1998/99	67.3	1.74	1.66	0.08	27,860
Cotton (bu):					
2001/02 Forecast	706	0.5192	0.3140	0.21	1,035
2000/01 Estimate	632	0.5192	0.4980	0.02	11,195
1999/00	607	0.5192	0.4500	0.07	3,571
1998/99	625	0.5192	0.6020	-.08	na
Rice (cwt):					
2001/02 Forecast	64.29	6.50	4.20	2.30	1,014
2000/01 Estimate	62.81	6.50	5.61	0.89	2,683
1999/00	58.66	6.50	5.93	0.57	4,486
1998/99	56.63	6.50	8.89	-2.39	na
Soybeans (bu):					
2001/02 Forecast	39.6	5.26	4.25	1.01	3,750
2000/01 Estimate	39.6	5.26	4.54	0.72	5,261
1999/00	36.6	5.26	4.63	0.63	6,505

ACRES NEEDED TO RECEIVE \$150,000 IN LDP BENEFITS
BASED ON SEASON AVERAGE PRICES—Continued

Commodity crop year	Average yield (units/acre)	Marketing loan price (\$/unit)	Season average price (\$/unit)	Hypothetical LDP pmt. (\$/unit)	Acres for \$150,000 in LDPs (acres)
1998/99	38.9	5.26	4.93	0.33	11,685

The calculations in this table assume LDPs are made on the difference between the marketing loan price and season average price. In practice, farmers are able to choose the day to receive the LDP. Years where the season average price is above the marketing loan price, payments are not applicable. Estimated prices are from USDA, World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, April 10, 2002. Forecast prices for 2001/02 are mid-points of forecast price ranges.

Senators Grassley and Dorgan want to help the family farmers! The fact is, so does the Senate. In a body that exhibits a lot of partisan disagreement, the amendment for payment limitations showed a large bi-partisan support! Quotes follow:

"When is enough enough? How long will the American public put up with programs that send out billions of dollars to the biggest farm entities?"—Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA)

"Many of the benefits provided through current ag programs are being funneled to large, non-family agriculture corporations while family farmers are being short-changed. That's just plain wrong."—Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND)

"The amendment would remove the loopholes that allow a handful of large farmers to receive unlimited payments . . . without real payment limitation reform, we will continue to weaken the same farmers we claim we want to help."—Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE)

"This is a modest amendment. I stress 'modest.' . . . there were 98,835 recipients of farm subsidies in Indiana during [1996-2000]. There are 6, out of 98,000, who would be affected by this amendment"—Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)

"I am very pleased that we were able to pass this important payment limitation amendment"—Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired.

Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. SMITH).

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

BUSH ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY

(Mr. FRANK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Speaker, it is becoming sadly clearer that the Bush ad-

ministration foreign policy consists of a successful military victory in Afghanistan, in a bipartisan fashion, with the military it inherited from Bill Clinton, but a series of muddles, mistakes, and errors elsewhere.

Most recently, we had the administration outrageously both incompetent and insensitive with regard to democratic values with regard to Venezuela. There was a coup in Venezuela against a president for whom I would not have voted and who I would wish would be voted out of office, but the notion that it is okay for America to disregard our supposed commitment to democratic values because we do not like the president who was elected is unfortunate, and it is even worse when it is done in such an incompetent fashion.

Our administration was congratulating the victors in this coup long after it became clear that the coup had not become successful. Someone said in the French revolution that something was not just a crime, but was a blunder. From the standpoint of defending democracy, the Bush administration in Venezuela managed to do both.

I include for the RECORD a very interesting article from the Washington Post of April 16, entitled "U.S. Seen as Weak Patron of Latin Democracy," as well as a very good article on the same day, April 16, from the New York Times by Paul Krugman. They both document the extent to which we both fail to defend our values, and even do that in a wholly incompetent fashion.

The articles referred to are as follows:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 16, 2002]

LOSING LATIN AMERICAN

(By Paul Krugman)

Many people, myself included, would agree that Hugo Chávez is not the president Venezuela needs. He happens, however, to be the president Venezuela elected—freely, fairly and constitutionally. That's why all the democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere, however much they may dislike Mr. Chávez, denounced last week's attempted coup against him.

All the democratic nations, that is, except one.

Here's how the BBC put it: "Far from condemning the ouster of a democratically elected president, U.S. officials blamed the crisis on Mr. Chávez himself," and they were "clearly pleased with the result"—even though the new interim government proceeded to abolish the legislature, the judiciary and the Constitution. They were presumably less pleased when the coup attempt collapsed. The BBC again: "President Chávez's comeback has . . . left Washington looking rather stupid." The national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, didn't help that impression when, incredibly, she cautioned the restored president to "respect constitutional processes."

Surely the worst thing about this episode is the betrayal of our democratic principles; "of the people, by the people, for the people" isn't supposed to be followed by the words "as long as it suits U.S. interests."

But even viewed as realpolitik, our benign attitude toward Venezuela's coup was remarkably foolish.

It is very much in our interest that Latin America break out of its traditional political cycle, in which crude populism alternated with military dictatorship. Everything that matters to the U.S.—trade, security drugs, you name it—will be better if we have stable neighbors.

But how can such stability be achieved? In the 1990's there seemed, finally, to be a formula; call it the new world order. Economic reform would end the temptations of populism; political reform would end the risk of dictatorship. And in the 1990's, on their own initiative but with encouragement from the United States, most Latin American nations did indeed embark on a dramatic process of reform both economic and political.

The actual results have been mixed. On the economic side, where hopes were initially highest, things have not gone too well. There are no economic miracles in Latin America, and there have been some notable disasters, Argentina's crisis being the latest. The best you can say is that some of the disaster victims, notably Mexico, seem to have recovered their balance (with a lot of help, one must say, from the Clinton administration) and moved onto a path of steady, but modest, economic growth.

Yet economic disasters have not destabilized the region. Mexico's crisis in 1995, Brazil's crisis in 1999, even Argentina's current crisis did not deliver those countries into the hands either of radicals or of strongmen. The reason is that the political side has gone better than anyone might have expected. Latin America has become a region of democracies—and these democracies seem remarkably robust.

So while the U.S. may have hoped for a new Latin stability based on vibrant prosperity, what it actually got was stability despite economic woes, thanks to democracy. Things could be a lot worse.

Which brings us to Venezuela. Mr. Chávez is a populist in the traditional mold, and his policies have been incompetent and erratic. Yet he was fairly elected, in a region that has come to understand the importance of democratic legitimacy. What did the United States hope to gain from his overthrow? True, he has spouted a lot of anti-American rhetoric, and been a nuisance to our diplomacy. But he is not a serious threat.

Yet there we were, reminding everyone of the bad old days when any would-be right-wing dictator could count on U.S. backing.

As it happens, we aligned ourselves with a peculiarly incompetent set of plotters. Mr. Chávez has alienated a broad spectrum of his people; the demonstrations that led to his brief overthrow began with a general strike by the country's unions. But the short-lived coup-installed government included representatives of big business and the wealthy—full stop. No wonder the coup collapsed.

But even if the coup had succeeded, our behavior would have been very stupid. We had a good thing going—a new hemispheric atmosphere of trust, based on shared democratic values. How could we so casually throw it away?

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 16, 2002]

U.S. SEEN AS WEAK PATRON OF LATIN DEMOCRACY

(By Karen DeYoung)

The Bush administration said yesterday that its policy toward the dizzying events in Venezuela had been fully in tune with the rest of the hemisphere, and that it will continue to work with its Latin American partners to preserve Venezuelan democracy and justice.

"We'll be guided by the Inter-American Democratic Charter," said State Department spokesman Philip Reeker, referring to the Organization of American States' seven-month-old agreement to condemn and investigate the overthrow of any democratically elected OAS member government and, if necessary, suspend the offender's membership.

But much of the rest of the hemisphere saw the administration's response to the last five days in Venezuela in a somewhat different light. In the view of a number of Latin American governments, they were the ones who rose to defend democracy, while the United States came limping along only when it became clear late Saturday that the Friday morning coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had only temporarily succeeded.

"The United States handled it badly, as is its wont," said a former Mexican official with close ties to the government of President Vicente Fox. U.S. policy, he said, is "multilateralism a la carte and democracy a la carte."

A senior administration official yesterday repeated denials of allegations by Chavez supporters that the United States had encouraged the coup, although he acknowledged that U.S. officials had met with a number of Chavez opponents. "They came here . . . to complain and to inform us and to tell us about the situation," he said. "We said we can't tell you to remove a president or not to remove a president . . . we did not wink, not even wink at anyone."

Few Latin American officials appeared to believe the United States was involved.

But they expressed a rueful lack of surprise at what they saw as the administration's failure, despite President Bush's frequent statements on the importance of hemispheric relations, to publicly oppose it once it happened.

Instead, diplomats concentrated on what the Latin Americans had done themselves, saying they were pleased that the OAS, a plodding, historically powerless body that has long been dominated by Washington, had actually managed to convene an emergency meeting on Saturday, adopt a strong resolution condemning both the coup and the violence that led up to it—apparently instigated by Chavez backers—and dispatch its secretary general on a fact-finding mission to Venezuela.

They were pleased that, despite their near-universal dislike of Chavez, a left-leaning populist who has irritated or worried most of them, they had defended democratic principles that have been so often violated in many of their own countries.

"It's an example of how it should work," said a diplomat who asked not to be named.

As recently as Friday, President Bush hailed the Democratic Charter in the White House's annual Pan-American Day proclamation, calling it an antidote to terror. The charter was approved by the 34 OAS member nations in Lima, Peru, on Sept. 11, the day of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell attended the gathering, but had to leave early to attend to more pressing matters in Washington.

The charter put more teeth in an earlier OAS democracy declaration signed in Santiago, Chile, in 1991. It was invoked on a number of occasions by President George H.W. Bush, and by President Bill Clinton, when unconstitutional actions threatened the governments of Peru, Paraguay, Guatemala and Ecuador over the last decade. The current Bush administration has referred to the documents as symbols of the democracy that now prevails in all but one nation in the hemisphere, Cuba.

Yet the first time elected governance was interrupted under Bush's watch, his adminis-

tration punted. Last Friday, South American presidents attending an unrelated meeting in Costa Rica broke off to sign a resolution condemning the apparent coup that had overthrown Chavez that morning and invoking the Inter-American Democratic Charter. As they were composing the document, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer was announcing in Washington that Chavez had provoked the crisis and resigned. "A transitional civilian government has been installed," Fleischer said. "This government has promised early elections." There was no mention of the Democratic Charter.

Most member countries have ambassadors at OAS headquarters here in addition to their envoys to the U.S. government. But while the OAS prepared Friday afternoon to convene an emergency meeting required under the charter, the Bush administration summoned all the hemisphere's bilateral ambassadors to a State Department briefing. According to several participants, Assistant Secretary Otto J. Reich told them the United States did not approve of coups and had not promoted this one, but that Chavez had it coming.

When the OAS meeting began Saturday morning, a Caracas businessman was occupying the presidential palace. Roger Noriega, the U.S. ambassador to the OAS, took the floor to chastise member states for being less concerned about Chavez's anti-democratic behavior over the past 24 months than events of the last 24 hours.

But as the day wore on, Venezuela's new president started taking some anti-democratic actions of his own, dissolving the National Assembly, shutting the Supreme Court and voiding the constitution. Chavez supporters flooded the streets.

"As it started to unravel," a diplomat said, "the United States became less and less eager to try to lead" the debate.

When Sunday morning found Chavez back in power in Caracas, Latin American governments hailed it as a victory for democracy. White House national security adviser Condoleezza Rice told NBC's "Meet the Press" viewers that she hoped Chavez had learned his lesson.

At the State Department, Reeker described the Venezuelan situation as "fluid," and said the administration was continuing to monitor it. The important thing, he said, "is the mission of the OAS. We want the OAS and the Democratic Charter that countries of the region signed up to play an important role in this process."

DOOLITTLE'S RAIDERS REUNION

(Mr. WILSON of South Carolina asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and included extraneous material.)

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, this week marks the 60th anniversary of the famous Tokyo raid conducted by Doolittle's Raiders, highlighted by a reunion of this courageous contingent being held in Columbia, South Carolina. General Woody Randal and hundreds of dedicated volunteers have organized a week-long tribute to our Raider heroes.

The Raiders were assembled in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, and trained at Columbia Army Airfield by the visionary General Jimmy Doolittle for their courageous service, which was crucial to raise America's shocked wartime spirits. The raid had profound